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Transit fare arbitrage is the scenario when two or more commuters agree to swap tickets during
travel in such a way that total cost is lower than otherwise. Such arbitrage allows pricing inefficiencies
to be explored and exploited, leading to improved pricing models. In this paper we discuss the
basics of fare arbitrage through an intuitive pricing framework involving population density. We
then analyze the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system to understand underlying
inefficiencies. We also provide source code and comprehensive list of pairs of trips with significant
arbitrage gain at github.com/asifhaque/transit-arbitrage. Finally, we point towards a uniform
payment interface for different kinds of transit systems.
MOTIVATION
With ever increasing global population and even faster den-
sification of various large metropolitan areas of the world,
mass transit systems are becoming more important. Improved
transit systems are also important for keeping personal cars
off of congested road networks, thus addressing climate change
concerns and making future switch to cleaner energy source
easier. Urban planners are hard at work designing faster,
cheaper, safer and more comfortable transit systems.
Most often local and federal governments are in charge of
building transit systems. If we view transit systems as a public
utility then this government control is reasonable. But it also
means that there is almost no competition in most cities. It is
widely believed that for most businesses competition may im-
prove efficiency and quality of service. One area where fierce
competition has helped reduce inefficiencies is electronic cap-
ital markets. Global stock exchanges and market places are
more at sync and bid-ask spreads are low. One core principle
that guides such optimization is the elimination of arbitrage
or riskless profit making.
The goal of this paper is to investigate whether there are
pricing inefficiencies in mass transit systems that can lead to
arbitrage and ask how we can improve transit fares for com-
muters. As a case study we looked at San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) system, which is the fifth largest tran-
sit system by ridership in the US. We also took a cursory
look at Washington DC Metrorail, which is the second largest
system in the US.
A motivating example is the case when one individual is
traveling from Millbrae station, a suburb south of San Fran-
cisco, to Embarcadero station which is downtown San Fran-
cisco, and at the same time a second individual is traveling
from Glen Park station, a residential area in San Francisco,
to Berkeley station where University of California Berkeley is
located. The two tickets cost (according to 2014 fare chart)
$4.50 and $4.20 respectively. But if during the segment be-
tween Glen Park station and Embarcadero station the two
travelers agree to exchange their tickets the cost becomes $5.10
and $1.85. So from a total cost of $8.70 a simple ticket swap
saves $1.75 or 20%.
Another similar example comes from Washington DC
FIG. 1. Fare arbitrage scenario involving two commuters with over-
lapping paths. One commuter is going from station A to C while
the other one is going from B to D.
Metrorail. If one individual is traveling from Vienna/Fairfax
station to Metro Center station on the Orange line and an-
other individual is traveling from Rosslyn station to New Car-
rollton station on the same train then during peak hours they
pay $5.3 and $4.9. But if the travelers decide to swap tickets
they pay $5.75 and $2.1 instead. So the saving is $2.35 or 23%
of total trip cost.
In the following sections we discuss general conditions for ar-
bitrage and how those are reflected in real systems like BART.
GENERALIZATION
In this paper we use the phrase fare arbitrage as the scenario
where two individuals traveling separately have overlapping
routes and may agree to exchange tickets to decrease the total
price of their trips. Higher order arbitrage where more than
two travelers decide to exchange tickets is not considered here.
Fig 1 shows a transit route from station A to D via stations
B and C. Suppose one traveler is going from station A to C
while another traveler is going from station B to D. Between
stations B and C both travelers are on the same train. If they
choose to swap tickets the transit system will see one traveler
going from station A to D while another from B to C. If the
total price of latter two tickets is less than the actual trips
then there is fare arbitrage.
The reverse case could also be true – if two travelers going
from A to D and B to C respectively have to pay higher price
than A to C and B to D then arbitrage becomes possible.
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2FIG. 2. Fare as a function of distance traveled. Center grey line is
the price proportional to distance. The blue line above the grey line
penalizes short distances while the red line below subsidizes them.
Fig 3 attempts to explain these curves using population density.
One simple pricing method that is quite common is to have
a fixed fare for all trips. Large transit systems such as New
York City and Chicago have such flat rates. Although this
method eliminates fare arbitrage, it may only be feasible for
a city with a large population, high density and high fraction
of citizens using the service for daily commute.
Another common strategy is to use a price proportional to
distance traveled. This fair pricing model is showed as the grey
line in fig 2. San Francisco Bay Area CalTrain system breaks
up the route into zones and uses prices that are proportional
to the number of zones traveled. Like the flat rate method,
this pricing strategy also eliminates fare arbitrage. But it may
not be optimal for revenue maximization if the transit system
is complex and population density is non-uniform. It may
also not be ideal if policy makers wish to change population
density by encouraging people to move closer to city center or
farther out.
Going back to the example in fig 1 let us assume that the
individual going from station A to C is traveling distance x
while the individual going from station B to D is traveling
distance y. Suppose y > x and d = y − x. Let us assume
f(.) is the fare as a function of distance. We can express the
arbitrage condition as follows.
f(x) + f(y) 6= f(x + y) + f(d)
If f(x) + f(y) > f(x + y) + f(d) and our two travelers
swap their tickets during their trip, they get a discount worth
f(x) + f(y)− f(x+ y)− f(d). This scenario is possible if the
fare function has a concave shape, as shown by the blue curve
in fig 2.
FIG. 3. Population density scenario for mass transit systems. Top
diagram shows a (blue) transit line passing through a dense region
while the bottom diagram shows a (red) transit line connecting two
dense regions.
In fig 2 the blue curve is above the fair grey line. This im-
plies short distances are penalized to maxmize transit revenue.
If the blue line had the same concave shape but were below
the grey line then short distances are fair but long distances
are subsidized.
If f(x) + f(y) < f(x + y) + f(d) then a pair of travelers
where one is traveling from A to D and the other from B to
C can get a discount of f(x + y) + f(d)− f(x)− f(y) if they
choose to swap tickets mid trip. Convex price functions such
as the red curve in fig 2 give rise to such arbitrage.
Since the red curve in fig 2 is below the grey line, short
distances are subsidized but long distances are fair. A similar
convex curve above the grey line would mean short distances
are fair but long distances are penalized.
Hypothetical population density scenarios related to price
functions in fig 2 are shown in fig 3. In the top diagram a
(blue) transit line starts and ends in sparse suburbs and passes
through a dense region. In this case revenue can be increased
by following the blue concave curve in fig 2 where there is an
extra charge to enter the dense region.
In the bottom diagram of fig 3 the (red) transit line connects
two dense regions, with sparse area in between. In this case
revenue is maximized if fares follow a convex curve similar to
the red curve in fig 2 but above the grey fair price line.
Both these scenarios are likely in real world and both give
rise to fare arbitrage. Intuitively, the top diagram in fig 3
should match global structure of most metropolitan areas. San
Francisco BART and Washington DC Metrorail does indeed
resemble this. But we also see evidence of smaller instances of
the bottom diagram of fig 3 in some part of the transit system.
3FIG. 4. Simplified map of Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system
with dense regions shown in ovals. Numbered small circles are
starting stations of various routes. Routes are listed in table I. The
thick line between San Francisco city and Oakland represents the
bay tunnel.
TABLE I. BART routes in fig 4.
Route Between stations
Millbrae-Richmond 1 and 4
SFO Airport-Pittsburg 2 and 5
Daly City-Dublin 3 and 5
Daly City-Fremont 3 and 6
Richmond-Fremont 4 and 7
CASE STUDY OF BART
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) is the fifth
largest transit system in the US with almost half a million
riders on average on a weekday. Fig 4 shows a simplified
diagram of BART with denser areas in ovals.
Five routes of BART according to fig 4 are shown in table I.
Four out of the five routes pass through dense San Francisco
city, cross the bay tunnel (thick line in fig 4), then through
dense Oakland and end in suburban areas. The other route
is the Richmond-Fremont line which passes through Oakland.
All five routes resemble the top diagram of population scenario
in fig 3.
Fig 5 shows fares from Millbrae towards Richmond at var-
ious stations as a function of number of stops. We notice
that the region between station 3 and station 7 corresponds
to the steep price of entering San Francisco city. Once inside
downtown San Francisco fares from Millbrae are flat until the
bay tunnel is crossed. There is a small bump between station
12 and station 14 to enter Oakland. Beyond Oakland fare
increases roughly linearly.
The route from San Francico airport has a higher fare, pre-
sumably due to airport fees. But we see the same fare curve
for the four routes through San Francisco city. The steep parts
of fig 5 correspond to the blue concave curve in fig 2 which, as
FIG. 5. Fare as a function of number of stops from Millbrae on
Millbrae-Richmond line.
FIG. 6. Fare as a function of number of stops from Richmond on
Richmond-Fremont line.
we have established earlier, allows arbitrage. The linear part
beyond city centers corresponds to the fair grey line in fig 2.
In fig 5 there is a small convex section near the end of route
between station 17 and station 22 resembling the red curve in
fig 2.
The Richmond-Fremont route fares from Richmond are
shown in fig 6. The bump corresponding to Oakland is smaller
and fare is linear beyond Oakland. There is another tiny con-
vex section near the end of the route.
Although arbitrage condition, as laid out earlier, is true for
the concave bumps in fig 5 and fig 6, actual arbitrage becomes
possible for one more reason – price asymmetry. Fares from
different stations even on the same route are different and
unless these are carefully aligned it would be possible to pay
less by swapping tickets. Table II shows a sample of pairs of
routes where fare arbitrage is possible.
4TABLE II. Sample BART routes where fare arbitrage is possible.
Gain as a percentage of total trip cost is shown in parentheses.
Route 1 Route 2 Gain (%)
sf-airport → embarcadero balboa-park → fremont 1.80 (12)
millbrae → montgomery-st balboa-park → walnut-creek 1.80 (18)
richmond → fremont bay-fair → hayward 1.05 (15)
orinda → pittsburg walnut-creek → concord 2.05 (36)
The first two rows in table II are due to the higher price
commuters have to pay when they travel from San Francisco
to Oakland compared to commuters who have started outside
San Francisco and already paid a high price to enter the city.
Someone going from San Francisco airport to Embarcadero
can swap tickets with someone from Balboa Park and leverage
the lower price to cross into Oakland.
The last two rows in table II are due to increased fares near
the end of the routes shown in fig 5 and fig 6. This is similar
to the red convex curve in fig 2. So a commuter going from
Richmond to Fremont can swap tickets with someone from
Bay Fair and avoid the higher price of the full route. For a
commuter from Bay Fair, Hayward and Fremont have very
similar fares.
BART has 44 stations and
(
44
2
)
= 946 unique trips. From
these 946 trips we get
(
946
2
)
= 446,985 unique pairs of trips.
Out of these pairs of trips 60,334 or 13.5% have arbitrage
opportunity of at least 5 cents and 4,666 or 1% have at least
$1 to be gained. The full list of these 4,666 pairs of trips
with net arbitrage amount and percentage is available at this
github repo file1.
Computing such pairs involves exhaustively finding over-
lapping paths between trips where the cost would be lower.
Given that transit graphs are often spanning trees, even
a brute force solution has complexity O(n5) where n is
the number of stations in the system. For BART n =
44 and computation finishes in under a minute on a lap-
top. Source code, input and output data is available at
github.com/asifhaque/transit-arbitrage
If BART authorities release anonymized data of every trip
for users traveling through the system it would be very in-
teresting to compute the total amount in dollars that San
Francisco Bay Area commuters can save every day.
It would be interesting to explore Washington DC Metrorail
in detail as well. Since it is a larger system with peak and off-
peak rates, arbitrage strategies could be more complicated.
Preliminary investigation exposes possibility of arbitrage.
Fig 7 shows fares from Vienna/Fairfax station towards New
Carrollton on the Orange line of Washington DC Metrorail.
We can see that the price structure is indeed very similar to
the blue line in fig 2 and what we have seen for BART. The
initial steep part passes through Falls Church suburbs leading
to slight flattening around George Mason University (station
FIG. 7. Fare as a function of number of stops from Vienna/Fairfax
station on the Orange line of Washington DC Metrorail.
5). There is another steep part leading to DC city center
around station 10. Heading out towards the suburbs prices
are essentially flat for commuters coming all the way.
DIRECTIONS
In this paper we have explored basics of transit fare arbi-
trage and analyzed BART fare structure both qualitatively
and quantitatively via exhaustive computation. Our study
highlights the need for careful design of pricing models for
transit systems.
One interesting direction that might lead to an efficient fare
system is if tickets are all electronic, ideally via a smartphone
app, that third parties can manage to optimize inidividual
trips. In recent years BART has moved from paper tickets
towards Clipper Cards (NFC tags). Data is encrypted on these
cards and can be read by any NFC reader but not written
to except for BART machines. If in future we start using
smartphone NFC capabilites (Google Wallet for example) and
allow third parties to dynamically swap account profile on
the smartphone app then arbitrage will be technically very
easy. It may even allow arbitrage between routes that do not
have overlapping paths and ultimately force the prices to be
arbitrage free and thus efficient. We can imagine companies
like Uber and Lyft managing such apps to provide commuters
with a uniform payment interface encompassing ride shares
and mass transit.
1 github.com/asifhaque/transit-arbitrage/blob/master/data/sf/arbitrage.txt
